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Introduction
For most of the post-World War II period prior to the 1980s, Costa Rica enjoyed
high levels of economic growth and produced a standard of living which was unique
in Central America and among the most satisfactory in all of Latin America. Social
programs institutionalized following the Civil War of 1948 provided adequate
coverage of the health care, educational, and social security needs of the vast
majority of the population, and the liberal democratic political system allowed for
wide spread participation in the formal political process. The combination of
political openness and social progress maintained social peace, an essential element
for the creation of a robust and healthy economy. The sta te played a major role in
guiding the mixed economy of the period, and the nationalization of the banking
system in 1948 provided the state with a powerful tool to guide development policy and
to assure that the benefits of economic growth did not become overly concentrated in a
single social sector. Industrial sector growth was stimulated by the protection of the
Central American Common Market, but the economy continued to rely on the
agricultural sector as the primary source of both export income and employment.
While needed foreign exchange was generated through the export of coffee, beef,
bananas, and sugar cane, peasant producers of basic grains, primarily corn, beans,
and rice, were subsidized by a government system which maintained an
economically active peasant sector and guaranteed low cost basic foods for the urban
population.
With the changes in the global economy in the 1970s, Costa Rica, like most of
the rest of Latin America, suffered from declining rates of economic growth which
evolved into economic stagnation and eventually crisis. The oil shocks of the 1970s,
increased international interest rates, declining terms of trade, and the collapse of
the Central American Common Market brought an end to the reformist
development model pursued by Costa Rica for the thirty years subsequent to 1948.
Costa Rica's continuous internal deficits and foreign trade imbalance dramatically
increased its foreign debt, and, by the early 1980s, created a situation in which Costa
Rica was forced to adopt measures designed by international financial organizations
in order rescue the beleaguered economy.
The new economic orientation of Costa Rica in the 1980s represents a distinct
break with the previous development model and has profound economic, political,
and social implications. The neoliberal economic model adopted by Costa Rica, a
model supported by international financial organizations, USAID, and the internal
economic and political elites, is a model based on economic efficiency, comparative
advantage, support for exports, and the opening of the economy to the forces of the
international market. Social programs have been curtailed, and state agencies
which previously supported peasant producers have had their budgets cut and their
programs reoriented to concentrate on export products. The reduction in social
programs and the emphasis on low wage labor in order to compete with other Latin
American and Third W orld nations in the export of assembled industrial products
(the maquila industries) has created greater social stratification than was previously
the case in Costa Rica. The standard of living of peasant producers has deteriorated
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markedly, and it is doubtful that the peasant c1ass will have any significant role to
play in the future development of the agricultural sector.
The deterioration of conditions in the countryside stimulated the creation of
almost 100 peasant organizations in the 1980s. These organizations were founded in
the hope of altering Costa Rica's agrarian policy and organized in direct response to
policies formulated by the International Monetary Fund, the W orId Bank, and
USAID, policies which are supported by both of the major political parties in Costa
Rica. The newly formed peasant organizations thus faced a well organized and
powerful opposition that coordinated its efforts and succeeded in implementing
structural changes in the Costa Rican economy. In order to challenge and modify
these structural changes, campesino organizations attempted for the first time to
form cohesive national level organizations to coordinate their efforts to save the
peasant way of life and bring pressure to bear to defend their interests. Prior to the
late 1970s, the working c1ass and peasant sectors had remained largely unorganized
in Costa Rica. Organizational 'efforts were seen, for the most part, as unnecessary
given the generous social programs and support for peasants provided by the central
government. In addition, the reformist program of the post-1948 period was strongly
opposed to the formation of autonomous popular sector organizations and actively
discouraged organized activities of the popular 'sector.! The newly organized peasant
groups were therefore formed in aclimate of advérsity and lacked organizational and
analytical skills which might have assisted them in their efforts.
This paper examines the attempts of the Costa Rican peasantry to organize
and influence economic policy in the.rapidly changing conditions of the 1980s. While
much of the paper is concerned with the campesino' organizations themselves, and
their perception of the changing economic reality, the first two sections examine the
economic crisis which engulfed Costa Rica in the earIy 1980s and the stabilization
and structural adjustment policies that were employed to confront the economic
crIsIS. '
The Economic Crisis
Following two decades of economic growth that averaged 6.4 percent per year,2
in 1981 and 1982 Costa Rica suffered negative rates of growth of GNP of 4.6 percent
and 8.9 percent respectively.3 The economic crisis of the 1980s began a process of
erosion of the previous social gains in Costa Rica and levels of income distribution
and other social indicators began to reflect the growing polarization of society and the
dec1ining standard of living. In 1983, 10 percent of the poorest families received only
2 percent of total income while the wealthiest 10 percent of all families received 37
percent of all income. Almost half of all family income was received by the
wealthiest 20 percent of families and the distribution of income became more
concentrated in the 1970s and earIy 1980s, as indicated by the following table.
1 For a discussion of the lack of popular sector participation in the reformist development model of the
1950s, 60s, and 70s, see Schifter, 1985; Solis y Esquivel, 1984; Donato y Rojas, 1987; Camacho, 1983;
and Menjivar, et al, 1985.
2 Weeks, 1985, p. 51
3 Villasuso, 1986b, p. 26
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In addition to the increasing concentration of income, the social programs that
sustained a style of living that made Costa Rica unique among the Central American
nations also suffered due to the economic crisis. Spending on social programs, as a
percentage of the public sector budget, fell from 52 percent in 1978 to 41 percent in
1984. This reduction of expenditure most heavily affected programs in the areas of
health care and education.5 Access to social programs was a substantial subsidy to
the income received by the majority of Costa Rican families and represented 32
percent of family income in 1980.6 The impact of the economic crisis, and the
reduction of accessibility and increasing cost of social programs, contributed to the
rapidly rising rate of poverty in Costa Rica. Families considered poor, that is, those
unable to satisfy their basic food requirements, increased from 41.7 percent of all
families in 1980 to 70.7 percent in 1982. In the rural areas the rates of poverty were
more severe than in the nation as a whole and the proportion of poor rural families
increased from 57.7 percent in 1980 to 88.9 percent in 1982.7
The impact of the economic crisis of 1980-1982 is dramatically revealed by the
following series of economic indicators: GNP declined by 10 percent; national income
fell by 22 percent and per capita income was reduced by 25 percent; real salaries fell
by 45 percent; prices increased by 180 percent; unemployrnent doubled to 9.4 percent
while underemployrnent increased to 21 percent; public investment declined rapidly
while foreign investment reached negative levels; and, in 1982, the cost of the basic
market basket consumed 86 percent of the average salary, 24 percent of national
income in left the country through payrnents for foreign investment, debt service,
and due to the deterioration of terms of trade, and exports fell by 13.1 percent.8 The
economic crisis and the reduction of social programs created a declining standard of
living for most low and medium income sectors and levels of expectation that were
generated during the economically prosperous years of the 1960s and early 1970s
were no longer attainable. Consumption of certain goods and services were no
longer within the reach of many Costa Ricans, aspirations of social mobility were
reduced, and access to higher education was les s available for the majority.9
While the cost of Costa Rica's welfare programs has often been blamed for the
collapse of the economy, public sector spending was probably not the most significant
4 Trejos y Elizalde E., p. 15
5 Universidad Nacional, 1986, p. 67
6 Donato, 1987, p. 58
7 Villasuso, 1986b, p. 41-42
8 Villasuso, 1986b, p. 10-11, p. 57; Programa de Seguridad Alimentaria, 1988, p. 5; Mora A., 1986, p. 12-
13
9 Guendel, 1987, p. 65; Donato y Rojas, 1987, p. 30
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culprit behind the economic debacle. This argument is put forth by John Weeks, who
states the following:
Through the 1970s, state expenditure on current goods and services rose
at the same rate as national income in real terms. In 1980, public
consumption expenditure was the same in constant colones as it had
been the year before, and fell by 7 percent in 1981. It is true that deficits
were high, but this was because real tax revenues did not increase, a
common consequence of reduced levels of economic activity. In any
case, the Costa Rican deficits were no higher than those of Guatemala
and Honduras, countries never accused of excessive social expenditure.
The Costa Rican economic collapse can be explained as a straight
forward case of a mounting debt burden combined with unfavorable
international prices.10
Costa Rica's economic crisis was caused by structural, not transitory, factors which
resulted in a continuous deficit in the balance of payments (even during periods of
rapid economic growth), an increase in external debt, the lack of integration of
productive structures, economic and technological dependence, as well as pressures
created by the growth of the public sector.l1
Under President Carazo (1978-1982), the persistent and growing public sector
deficit was financed through the acquisition of short term foreign loans, often at high
rates of interest, and through the utilization of the international monetary reserve.
These two sources of foreign exchange allowed President Carazo to maintain an
overvalued exchange rate for the colon. This policy encouraged imports, contributed
to the deficit in the commercial balance, and created increased levels of foreign
debt.12 The economic crisis in Costa Rica was further aggravated by the rapid
decline in the terms of trade of Costa Rica's primary exports. These products fell in
value by 1/3 in comparison to the country's imports between 1977 and 1981. As a
result of balance of payments and internal budget deficits and declining terms of
trade, Costa Rica's foreign debt increased from $800 million in 1977 to $3 billion in
1982, when debt service accounted for 60 percent of the value of exports.13 The
economic burden created by debt service payments and the economic stagnation
created by the collapse of the Central American Common Market and the limited
growth potential offered by Costa Rica's traditional agricultural exports made it clear
that substantial changes would have to be made in Costa Rica's economic structures,
changes which would necessarily have a social and political impact as well.
Beginning in 1982, newly elected President Monge began the process of reorienting
Costa Rican society along policy lines advocated by neoliberalism. This approach
was strongly supported by international financial organizations and Costa Rican
political and business elites, but popular sector organizations were all but excluded
from the debate surrounding this new policy direction and have paid the highest
costs of the economic and social reorganization.
10 Weeks, 1985, p. 186
11 Fallas, 1984, p. 24
12 Villasuso, 1986b, p. 24-25; Rodriguez, 1988, p. 27-29
13 Weeks, 1985, p. 186; Villasuso, 1986b, p. 35
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Economic Stabilization and Structural Adjustment
The Monge administration (1982-1986) faced two immediate challenges: the
renegotiation of the foreign debt and the restructuring of the economy to achieve
economic growth. Unlike President Carazo, who signed two agreements with the
IMF, both of which were suspended by the IMF due to lack of completion of the terms
of agreement on the part of the Costa Rican government, President Monge firmly
believed that the tremendous burden generated by the foreign debt could only be
alleviated through the support of the IMF and other international financial
organizations. Beginning in 1982, the policy orientation of the Costa Rican
government concentrated on first achieving economic stabilization through
complying with an IMF designed program, and secondly, focused on achieving
economic growth through the promotion of non-traditional exports to third markets
(that is, those outside of the Central American Common Market).
President Monge signed an agreement with the IMF in December of 1982
which included many of the traditional IMF requirements: the elimination of
ceilings on interest rates and quota restrictions for imported goods; devaluation of the
colon and the elimination of muItiple exchange rates; the end of subsidies to industry
and agricuIture; the reduction of government spending; and an increase in revenues
and the cost of government provided services.14 As a resuIt of measures undertaken
by the Costa Rican government, particularly through the combination of increased
government revenues and reduced government expenditures, the fiscal deficit
declined from 14 percent of GNP in 1981 to 2.5 percent of GNP in 1984. However, the
increase in state revenues was achieved through regressive measures which had
their greatest negative impact on the popular sectors. N ot only did the cost of
government services increase for such items as electricity, water, telephone, gas,
and social services, but the tax structure became increasingly dependent on indirect
taxes. The structure of state tax revenue changed from 40 percent in come taxes and
60 percent indirect taxes in the 1960s to 15 percent income tax and 85 percent indirect
taxes in the 1980s, a change that strengthened the regressive tax structure.15
Meeting the demands of the IMF meant that Costa Rica entered a period of
austerity, but the IMF itself did not demand many structural changes to the
economy. The IMF interpreted the economic disequilibrium of the Costa Rican
economy as being caused by the impact of the expansion of aggregate demando This
demand was expressed through increased consumption and government spending,
which, in turn, created inflation, balance of payrnents deficits, and slow rates of
growth in production and employment, according to the IMF. To resolve these
problems, the IMF promoted a stabilization program of monetary policies in order to
steady prices, achieve a balance of payrnents equilibrium (imports and exports), and
reduce consumption and government expenditures. While the IMF traditionally
sought solutions for economic problems through the control of demand for goods and
services, in the case of Costa Rica it added supply side modifications such as
reduction of income taxes and the elimination of market regulations. These changes
fostered market liberalization, and put IMF policy in line with the neoliberal
14 Weeks, 1985, p. 186
15 Villasuso, 1986b, 12-13, 51-53; interview with Juan Manuel Villasuso, Minister of Planning,
Monge Administration, September 23, 1988
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orientation which was rapidly attaining a dominant rol e in the formation of Costa
Rica's economic policy.16
Within two years of the implementation of the stabilization policies, Costa Rica
had contained inflation, implemented a manageable program for the devaluation of
the exchange rate, reduced the public sector deficit, and was progressing in the
process of debt renegotiation. However, the success of the stabilization program
was contingent upon one factor of overwhelming importance, the dramatically
increased level of U.S. financial aid. According to Gomez and Seligson, the collapse
of the Costa Rican economic, social, and political systems was prevented due to the
massive levels of U.S. economic assistance.17 Costa Rica became the second highest
recipient of U.S. aid per capita in the world, behind Israel,18 and the immediate
improvement in economic performance was due to this massive infusion of funds
rather than to the new economic orientation based on the increase of exports.19
Given the debt service requirements, declining terms of trade, and other economic
problems, the receipt of foreign aid and donations was of crucial importance in order
to maintain social cohesion during the process of economic stabilization. Without
these resources, the social cost of adjustment would have be en much higher and may
have had an unforeseen impact on the political and social systems. During the first
three years of the Monge administration, economic assistance from the United
States, through AID, totalled $634 million, compared to $67 million from 1978-81. In
terms of all assistance received by Costa Rica in the 1983-1984 period, AID accounted
for 47 percent of new resources received in 1983 and 44 percent in 1984. If
international organizations over which the U.S. has strong influence are included,
such as the IMF, the Interamerican Development Bank, and the W orld Bank, then
totals increase to 83 percent in 1983 and 65 percent in 1984.20 The success of the
Costa Rican economic program depended on this aid and the pivotal role played by
the U. S. government greatIy increased its influence in the formation of Costa Rican
economic policy. However, the ultimate cost of this assistance was the reduced
ability of national authorities to develop a national project for economic reactivation.
The requirements of the various international agencies involved in the resuscitation
of the economy reduced the number of economic policy alternatives that could have
been considered in Costa Rica in the 1980s.21
The signing of an agreement with the IMF in 1982 helped to put in place a
development strategy based on neoliberal economic principIes, an economic policy
that implied a redistribution of economic, social, and political power. The economic
crisis of the early 1980s bolstered the critical arguments of conservative groups
within Costa Rican society who argued that Costa Rica could no longer continue to
maintain the previous social democratic structure, a structure which created a
society which consumed more than it produced and thus caused deficits and debts.
State intervention in the economy was viewed by these groups as the principIe cause
of economic problems and the proposed cure was a neoliberal program based on
16 CENAP, et al, 1988, p. 39
17 Gomez and Seligson, 1986, p. 9-28
18 Sanders, 1986, p. 45; Crosby, 1987, p. 18
19 Gudmundson, 1984 a, p. 1
20 ViUasuso, 1986b, p. 57
21 ibid, p. 58-60
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comparative advantage, the promotion of exports, the restriction of internal demand,
the reduction of real salaries, the reduced role of the state, a reliance on market
forces, and the promotion of foreign investments.22 According to the neoliberal
approach, the force s of the free market guarantee maximum efficiency in the
assignment of economic and social resources and also promote individual liberty
and the democratic character of economic decision-making. The neoliberal
approach was further justified by the belief that an emphasis on exports, particularly
those favored through comparative advantage, would stimulate the non-export
sectors of the economy through the creation of backward and forward linkages and
would eventually create rapid self-sustained economic growth.23 Opponents of
neoliberal policies criticized the approach by claiming that its previous
implementation in other Latin American countries promoted the concentration of
the means of production and weaUh, allowed for the indiscriminate opening of the
country to foreign investment in a manner that precluded the formation of a coherent
economic plan, failed to create democratic participation in the economy, often forced
small producers out of the market given their inability to compete with
internationally funded large producers, created a declining standard of living for the
majority, and resulted in reduced levels of social services.24 The neoliberal approach
typically contained no mechanisms to redistribute the benefits of economic growth
and, according to the critics, created export sectors that were isolated from the rest of
the economy and therefore could not contribute to economic integration. Even though
broad sectors of society were viewed as being opposed to the neoliberal model, the
Costa Rican political and economic elites supported the approach and found powerful
allies in the international financial organizations.25
The imposition of the neoliberal model was, in part, the result of a political
offensive by the business sector to recuperate, maintain, and guarantee their
accustomed levels of income.26 Since 1978, powerful though minority groups in
society had been redefining the role of the state in the attempt to reduce its economic
and social role.27 These conservative groups maintained that Costa Rica's economic
problems were the result of state intervention and that democratic control over the
state should not be responsible for the determination of national development or
social policies. Progress in these areas, it was reasoned, should be left to individual
enterprise and self-interest should determine the direction of development and
provide for the satisfaction of social needs.28 With the onset of the economic crisis,
the industrial elite withdrew its support from the state dominated system and formed
an alliance with the traditional agricultural elite, thus clearing the way for the
introduction of neoliberal policies.29
22 Gamier, 1987, p. 34; Zuniga, 1987, p. 94
23 Bulmer-Thomas, 1987a, p. 278
24 Fallas, 1984, p. 13; Gamier, 1987, p. 41; Zuniga, 1987, p. 95
25 Zuniga, 1987, p. 96
26 Universidad Nacional, 1986, p. 40
27 Vega, 1983, p. 406-407
28 Rodriguez, 1987, p. 168
29 Rivera Urrutia, 1982, p. 57
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The change in perspective of the economic elites created a significant impact
on the political system. Acting through their well organized chambers in industry,
agriculture, commerce, and construction, economic elite s exerted a strong influence
on political decision-making and, with the support of the international financial
organizations, were able to reorient economic structures.30 Due to changing
international and internal circumstances, the Partido de Liberación Nacional, the
force behind the creation of the interventionalist state, altered its policies and drew
closer to the views of the conservative Partido Unidad Social Cristiana. By 1982, both
of Costa Rica's major political parties embraced the neoliberal approach and the
economically dominant class gained control over the political and economic
agenda.31 Thus an alliance and coordination of interests was created between
international financial organizations and internal economic and political elite s that
succeeded in determining a new direction for economic activity and reoriented the
development of the productive sectors.32
International financial organizations directed the reorganization of the Costa
Rican economy through a policy of "intertwined conditionality" which made access to
programs of debt relief contingent upon the fulfillment of a variety of economic,
social,and political demands put forth by several distinct organizations. Economic
adjustment with conditionality can be traced to the signing of the agreement with the
IMF in December of 1982 and for all intents and purposes Costa Rican economic
policy decisions were dominated by the demands and constraints imposed by the
IMF, the World Bank, and U.S. AID beginning in 1983.33 The coordination of these
agencies in the management of Costa Rica's economic affairs meant that the
continuation of the IMF program, viewed by Costa Rican politicians as absolutely
necessary for the solution of the debt crisis, depended not only on the fulfillment of
the requirements of the IMF but on those of AID and the World Bank as well. The
continuation of the crucially important assistance provided by AID thus depended on
the maintenance of a satisfactory relationship with the IMF and the implementation
of the structural adjustment policies advocated by the World Bank.34 This
coordinated conditionality restricted the access to international funds and required
Costa Rica to complete the programs for all three international organizations in
order to receive funds from any of the three.35 The international financial
organizations coordinated their efforts to impose a neoliberal economic programo
The short term goal of the IMF to achieve economic stability was thus
complimented by policies of the World Bank and AID that focused on the reduction of
the both role of that state and the protection of the economy. For its part, AID
strongly supported the privatization of the banking system and made the
continuation of its assistance contingent upon the creation of a private banking
structure.36 Perhaps the most important result of the 1948 Civil War was the
30 Interview with Edwin Ramirez, Sub-Director of Global Planning, Ministry of Planning
31 Rovira Mas, 1987, p. 160-162; interview with Manuel Baldares Carazo, Director, Instituto de
Investigaciones en Ciencias Economicas, Universidad de Costa Rica
32 Universidad Nacional, 1986, p. 38
33 Bulmer-Thomas, 1987, p. 248-249; Rovira Mas, 1987, p. 76
34 Vega M., 1984, p. 60-61
35 Rodriguez, 1988, p. 105-106
36 Villasuso, 1986b, p. 62-63
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nationalization of the banks in Costa Rica. This act alIowed the government to use
internal savings, international loans and assistance, and other more direct
government control over the economy (such as control over the growth of the money
supply) to coordinate the development of the nation. The freedom provided by a
nationalIy controlIed process of development alIowed political and social factors to
weigh heavily in the formation of development policy and created the admirable
standard of living enjoyed in Costa Rica through the 1950s, 60s, and 70s.
Development policy was not based solely on economic criteria and state control over
the process, inc1uding the financial system, opened the development process to
political control through the democratic system. AID's insistence on the creation of
prívate banks reduced democratic participation in development and required a
change in Costa Rican laws (la Ley de la Moneda y la Ley del Banco Central) which
was finalIy achieved after 16 months of legislative conflicto In addition to the creation
of private banks, AID also conditioned its assistance on the privatization of many of
the Costa Rican government supported, though semi-autonomous, development
agencies (CODESA). To achieve this end, AID created a $140 million fund which was
used for the purchase of CODESA companies which were then resold to the private
sector.3?
The World Bank conditioned the extension of a $300 million structural
adjustment loan on the successful completion of a series of demands that included
the modification of tariff rates to reduce the protection of industry in order to force
Costa Rican manufacturers to be competitive on the international market.38 In
addition, the World Bank supported the elimination of internal subsidies and
promoted the use of Costa Rica's comparative advantages to produce export products
which could be successful in the generation of foreign exchange.39 In 1985, the
Costa Rican government reached an agreement on a financial package with the
participation of AID, the World Bank, and the IMF which inc1uded new loans but for
which the government had to adapt the specific economic policies outlined above.
This general policy orientation was continued under President Arias through the
signing of new agreements with the IMF and the World Bank in 1987. As a result,
the state lost the ability to guide the development process and was weakened vis a vis
the power of the international organizations and the private banks.40 The
conditionality confronted by Costa Rica reduced the government's ability to formulate
economic policy, weakened formal political institutions, and undermined the
authority of the government.41
In 1985, when Costa Rica reached agreement on a financial package with its
international creditors, the government issued a Declaration of Development Policy
that accompanied the structural adjustment agreement with the World Bank. This
declaration committed Costa Rica to a plan to reactivate the economy without
destabilization and to transform the productive system by developing a new export
sector.42 The development plan encouraged the opening to the international market,
37 Interview with Rodolfo Solano Orfila, Advisor to the Ministry of Planning
38 Villasuso, 1986b, p. 62-63
39 CENAP, et al, 1988, p. 40
40 Gutierrez y Vargas, 1986, p. 22
41 Lizano, 1987, p. 171-172
42 ibid
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promoted exports as the engine of economic growth, proposed to gradually eliminate
barriers to imports, and encouraged foreign investment. The structural adjustment
policies pursued in Costa Rica redefined the rol e of the state and reduced subsidies
for economic activities oriented towards the internal market in order to support the
promotion of exports. In short, the policies of structural adjustment created
profound changes in the rules of the game that had far reaching political and social
impact as well as the intended alteration of economic structures. Structural
adjustment was more than mere economic change. It involved the reordering of
society and its true cost was to be found in the social and political transformations
that result from the restructuring of productive activities and processes.43
The process of structural adjustment spawned by the debt crisis caused Costa
Rica to restructure its economy to concentrate on exports in order to generate much
needed foreign exchange. The industrial sector was transformed through the
introduction of maquila style assembly industries that process imported inputs for
re-export and make use of Costa Rica's comparative advantage of low industrial
wages. But the strongest impact of the reorientation of Costa Rica's economy was in
the agricultural sector. In order to comply with the export orientation mandated by
the structural adjustment policies advocated by the World Bank and others, the Arias
administration introduced a new agricultural policy called agricultura de cambio,
although the changes in the agricultural sector dated back to the beginning of the
economic crisis in the early 1980s. The Arias administration broadly defined
agricultura de cambio as a program that would seek to fulfill the following goals:
increase production and productivity of traditional exports; develop non-traditional
export products; guarantee adequate credit for all agricultural needs; increase
delivery of land to landless peasants and accelerate the titling program for those who
worked untitled land; generate more emploYffient and income in the agricultural
sector; offer the consumer a greater variety of foods at reasonable prices; and
continue with the production of basic foods required for internal consumption.44
However, many of these stated goals failed to receive the attention of the government
and in practice the program of agricultura de cambio was accurately characterized
as active government support for the increased production of exportable agricultural
products, either traditional or non-traditional in nature. Aspects of the program, as
defined by the Arias administration, that would have benefitted the peasant sector,
such as the extension of credit, support for the production of basic foods, or
improvements in the agrarian reform program, were never acted upon and the
actions taken by the government had an adverse affect on the peasantry.
While failing to address the needs of the peasant basic grains producing
sector, the state actively supported agricultural exports through a variety of policy
changes and incentive programs inc1uding the following: the reduction of
commercial taxes; the introduction of preferential interest rates for export products;
the orientation of technical assistance towards non-traditional export crops; the
reduction of agricultural protection and the alignment of national prices with
international prices; the elimination of subsidies to consumers and producers; the
abandonment of support for the internal production of those food products that the
government determined were cheaper to purchase on the international market; the
support for the increased use of technology; the provision of marketing and support
43 CEPAS, 1989, p. 9-10
44 Universidad Nacional, 1986, p. 36
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services for new export crops; and a continuous devaIuation of the colon to
encourage exports.45 AlI of these changes worked to the detriment of those who
produced for the internal market.
Costa Rican producers of basic grains, primariIy peasants who cultivate corn
and beans, and, to a Iesser extent, rice, had previously been protected by government
programs which guaranteed the purchase of basic grains at fair prices. The grains
were then sold to consumers at below market value which meant that the
government was subsidizing both the production and consumption of basic grains.
These subsidies contributed to the public sector deficit and the reduction of the deficit
demanded by the IMF caused this program to be phased out. The Ministry of
Agriculture supported the termination of producer subsidies by reaching the
conclusion that small producers would never be able to Iead Costa Rica to seIf-
sufficiency in basic grains because they lacked the appropriate technology to improve
productivity. In light of this conclusion, the Ministry supported the increased
importation of basic grains in order to satisfy the demands of the internal market.46
The import of corn, beans, and wheat was arranged through the PL 480 program of
the U.S. government. The first agreement with the PL 480 program was signed in
1982 and the program has be en renewed in each subsequent year.47
The demands of the international financial organizations, and particularly the
structural adjustment agreement with the World Bank, resulted in the restructuring
of Costa Rica's productive sectors based on outward Iooking development,
comparative advantage, economic efficiency, and international competitiveness.48
Critics have charged that as a result of the economic crisis and mounting debt
problems, Costa Rica sacrificed its sovereignty and ability to formulate nationally
oriented development policies and that economic decision-making was taken over by
the international financial organizations. The new deveIopment model has not been
subject to pubIic debate or approval and is therefore anti-democratic, the critics
argue. The immediate impact of the neoliberal orientation was detrimental for the
majority of the economically active population, wage labor and small and medium
producers, and has the additional disadvantage of promoting the decline in food self-
sufficiency, a change that resulted in increased international dependence.
Structural adjustment in the agricultural sector threatens the existence of the
peasantry who are unable to match the prices of basic grains offered through the
subsidized PL 480 program and are therefore considered to be inefficient
producers.49 Economic policies that result from an emphasis on private enterprise
and initiative are incapable of organizing national production to meet the economic
and social needs of the Costa Rican people. According to the critics, reduced state
participation in the distribution of wealth, previously accomplished through social
programs and economic subsidies, promotes the monopolization of production, the
private appropriation of collectively produced profit, the concentration of wealth, and
the deterioration of the standard of living. 50
45 CENAP, et al, 1988, p. 44-45; Programa de Seguridad Alimentaria, 1988, p. 54; Mora A., 1988, p. 25
46 CEPAS, 1988a, p. 11
47 CENAP, et al, 1988, p. 29
48 Universidad Nacional, 1986, p. 18
49 Universidad Nacinal, 1986, p. V
50 Reuben Soto, 1982, p. 148
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The international financial organizations, working in conjunction with
powerful economic and political interests within Costa Rica, are changing the
landscape of the country by promoting the cultivation of non-traditional export crops.
As a result, resources have been centralized, production has been concentrated in
large enterprises, technological developments have reduced labor requirements, and
capital resources available for small producers have dec1ined.51 The promotion of
agricultural exports creates favorable conditions for agribusiness enterprises and
encourages the concentration of land holdings.52 According to the National Bank,
at least 50 percent of the new non-traditional export crops (citrus, ornamental plants,
flowers, and pineapples) are controlled by foreign owners.53 Since the processing
and marketing of these products is concentrated in foreign hands, it is unc1ear to
what extent Costa Rican producers are benefiting from the new agricultural
orientation. The concentration of land ownership presents a serious challenge to
Costa Rica since, from the colonial period, social peace has been maintained by the
relatively egalitarian access to the ownership of the means of production.54 For the
Costa Rican peasantry, the new economic orientation presents a serious challenge to
their continued existence as a productive group.
The Peasant Sector: Mobilization. and Ore-anization
The structural adjustment of the Costa Rican economy, beginning in 1982, has
had a tremendous impact on the basic grains producing peasant sector. The
outward orientation emphasizing exports, embodied in the polícy of agricultura de
cambio, and the import of basic grains through the PL 480 program, has jeopardized
the very existence of the Costa Rican peasantry. However, given the changes in
international economic relations and the restructuring of the Costa Rican economy
in the 1980s, it is relevant to question whether or not the continuation of a peasant
c1ass is important for the future of Costa Rica as a stable, democratic society. Oscar
Arias, in his rol e as a polítical scientist before becoming president of the republic,
addressed this primary concern. In his opinion, the strengthening of political
democracy was only possible through the establishment of an improved system of
economic democracy, a process which depended upon the egalitarian distribution of
the ownership of the means of production.55 The concentration of the means of
production was, in his view, a serious problem. Since Costa Rican democracy was
historically supported by an economic structure which inc1uded the participation of
small property owners, the democratic system itself was viewed as being threatened
by the diminution of this sector and the strengthening of small producers was
therefore necessary.56 According to Arias, significant progress in the attempt to
reduce poverty in the rural areas could only be achieved through an increase in the
51 Universidad Nacional, 1986, p. 39
52 Weeks, 1985, p. 63
53 CEPAS, 1988a, p. 18
54 Villasuso, 1986a, p. 68-69
55 Arias, 1984, p. 121
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productivity of the small producer. The improvement of the standard of living of this
group would slow the rural-urban migration and it was therefore imperative to find
the means to keep campesinos rooted to the land and create a situation in which they
could obtain sufficient income to live a dignified life.57
In order to facilitate the process of development, Arias maintained that it was
indispensable to achieve greater participation of all social sectors in the economic,
social and political aspects of the process. He advocated a new development model
that demanded the democratization of the means of production and the improved
distribution of property in agriculture, industry, and services. Such a model would
depend on the strengthening of small enterprises and the author maintained that
democracy was more stable and just when it consisted of many owners of means of
production rather than a preponderance of proletariat.58 In the early 1980s, this
point of view maintained that the possibility of overcoming the economic crisis
depended in large part on formation of representative organizations by the majority
of the population and on the willingness of the government to allow for greater
participation in the perfecting of the economic, political, and social systems. It was
proposed that every important development activity undertaken should include the
active and critical participation of interested groups and that society should strive to
increase economic democracy59.
The meaningful participation in the process of development by sectors which
had previously be en excluded from the decision-making process became an
important developmental goal. This type of participation was necessary in order to
increase access to property and create social well being that did not depend solely on
wages.60 The broadening of democratic liberties depended upon the capacity of
disadvantaged groups to participate in existing institutions and was contingent upon
the acceptance by the dominant class of the need to incorporate other groups into the
political decision-making process.61 The organization of campesinos into effective
interest groups was necessary in order to broaden their participation and the
continuation of peasant production was understood to serve social and polítical, as
well as economic, purposes. The decomposition of this class would deepen the
situation of poverty in Costa Rica and increase social pressures and conflicts. The
survival of the peasantry was therefore essential in order to avoid the deterioration of
economic and political conditions and this could only be achieved through the
implementation of policies that met their needs.62
Despite the recognized economic and social needs of the peasantry, the fragile
economic recuperation of recent years has not affected all sectors of society equally
and for the campesino not only has there been no recuperation but the situation has
continued to deteriorate. The declining standard of living for small and medium
producers was aggravated by problems of land tenancy, credit, prices, and
production costs.63 Prior to the 1980s, the state supported the campesino sector
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through a conservative program of land distribution and titling, intervention in
agrarian conflicts, the extension of credit at preferential rates, and the maintenance
of institutions responsible for the commercialization of agricultural products.
Previous state support for the campesino sector sustained the social system but in the
1980s peasant concerns were subordinated to private financial and commercial
interests as well as to new state policies regarding land, credit, and other support
services.64 The neoliberal opening to the international economy did not benefit most
Costa Ricans and small producers were not participating in the new development
strategy. Privatization and the reduction of the role of the state produced changes
which were difficult to adjust to for various sectors of society and the central concern
of the peasant sector was to protect the mechanisms which guarded against the
widening of social inequities while surviving as a productive family unit.65
In response to the neoliberal development strategy, organized movements
developed in support of those producing for the internal market. The economic crisis
of the early 1980s increased rural povertY and threatened the decomposition of the
peasant sector and the growth of the campesino movement was directIy tied to the
implementation of the new development policies.66 Beginning in the late 1970s,
peasant groups formed throughout the country to oppose policies that displaced
campesinos and reduced the production of corn, beans, rice. Small, medium and
large producers of basic grains (rice is often produced by large producers) began to
coordinate their opposition to the export oriented government policy. The common
outrage shared by these diverse groups characterized the general nature of the crisis
of those producing for internal consumption.67 The peasantry slowly carne to the
conclusion that the government no longer conceived of the campesinos as a
necessary sector of society. They viewed the government as using a carrot and stick
approach to the situation by sustaining the campesinos when politically necessary or
advantageous, but subsequentIy implementing policies that were detrimental to the
interests of the sector. The only options for the peasants were to struggle to maintain
their positions as independent producers or face the undesirable prospect of working
as wage labor.68 It was commonly believed that the neoliberal emphasis on exports
and efficiency left no room for peasant producers.69
From the perspective of the Costa Rican peasantry, the agrarian crisis was
caused by a series of factors including the following: insufficient access to credit; the
slow reduction in area planted in crops for internal consumption; the under
financing and dismantling of institutions responsible for providing services to the
campesinos, such as the Instituto de Desarrollo Agraria (IDA), the Consejo
Nacional de Produccion (CNP), and the Ministerio de Agricultural y Ganaderia
(MAG), due to reductions in public spending caused by the agreements with the
international financial organizations; declining income for basic grains producers
due to insufficient price policies beginning with devaluation of 1982; the lack of
64 Mora A, 1988, p. 5
65 CEPAS, 1988a, p. 8-9; Mora A, 1986, p. 40
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technical training and support for small producers; unjust conditions of
commercialization; and increasing small producer debt.?O Basic grains producers
were hit hard by the rapid devaluation of the colon in the early 1980s, an economic
shock that increased production costs but did not produce an equivalent
compensation in prices since most basic grain prices were regulated by law. Thus it
became increasingly difficult for basic grains producers to repay their bank loans,
and the already tenuous relationship between the peasantry and the banks suffered a
further decline.?1
The major agricultural program of the 1980s, agricultura de cambio, has not
benefitted peasant producers. The general orientation of this program has been
limited to the support of both non-traditional and traditional agricultural export
crops and to the improvement of the technical aspects of production to allow those
exports to compete in the international market. The requirements for participation
in the program of agricultura de cambio all but precluded campesino involvement.
Barriers to campesino participation included: lack of access to the technology and
agricultural chemicals necessary for high quality production; limited guarantees
regarding the purchase of export products by companies in charge of
commercialization; and the lack of guaranteed international prices. The importance
of processing and commercÍalization of the new export crops reduced the autonomy
of producers and, it was feared, would create a new form of campesino
subordination. Participation in the program under those conditions would have
reduced peasant autonomy, jeopardized the ability of the peasant sector to develop a
survival strategy, and increased dependence on the international market over which
they have no contro1.72
Despite the potential problems with agricultura de cambio, the majority of
peasants were not firmly set against the program and realized the importance of
diversifying Costa Rica's exports. What most disturbed the peasant sector was the
lack of clear government guidelines regarding the cultivation of new products, the
conditions for financing and commercialization, and the level of future risks. In
order for the peasant sector to participate in agricultura de cambio, they would need
better access to capital investment and technology, but the small size of peasant plots
of land made it impossible to guarantee needed loans. In addition, the agricultural
expertise of the peasant sector was oriented towards the production of basic grains
and they lacked the resources necessary to survive during the slow maturation time
of the new export crops. Peasants needed alternative forms of productive
organization in order to continue the production of basic foods while developing new
crops.?3 They therefore supported a slow process of the introduction of new export
crops which would include a guaranteed system of commercialization, the
conservation of the mixed nature of peasant production combining export products
with the cultivation of basic grains for the internal market, and the creation of equal
incentives for production of products for internal consumption and for exports,?4
Campesinos were therefore not against the concept of agricultura de cambio, but
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were unable to participate given the circumstances. The basic goal of the peasant
family was to continue to produce on land which they owned, and thus avoid
becoming salaried workers for multinational corporations, even if they had to
produce crops for export instead of the traditional basic grains.75
The increasingly difficult economic situation faced by the peasant sector was
exacerbated by the historic inability of peasants to playa meaningful political role in
the process of economic decision-making. By the late 1970s, stagnant economic
conditions had created a decline in the standard of living in the rural areas and
agricultural production had already been reoriented to benefit of capital intensive
technology and multinational corporations. Agricultural development created a
concentration of land holdings and contributed to the increasing lack of integration
between Costa Rican production and the needs of the population.76 Any hope of
having a significant enough impact to forestall the negative consequences of this
approach lay in political institutions out of the reach of peasant influence. Most
peasants felt politically powerless and were so alienated from the political system
that they did not participate in any way to try to change the situation.77 The rural
sector lacked organized groups which may have been able to defend the interests of
the rural poor, and thus little was done to try to limit the increased concentration of
social and economic benefits in Costa Rican society.78 While well educated and
influential Costa Ricans actively participated in the decision-making process
through organized interest groups and their close connection to the political par ti es,
the majority of the population, including the peasantry, limited their political
participation to voting in elections for political parties that shared the same basic
economic program.79 Peasant organizations sometimes emerged to demand specific
actions by government authorities, demands which usually went partially or wholly
unmet, but this was not a frequent nor widespread occurrence through the 1970s.
The struggle for survival among the Costa Rican peasantry produced an
expansion of the campesino movement. Beginning in 1978, primarily landless
peasants began to broaden their previous organizational efforts and to intensify their
endeavor to obtain land. The attempt to gain access to land became increasingly
difficult as Costa Rica reached the end of the agrarian frontier and and as the
distribution of land holdings became more concentrated. Landless campesinos
formed region level organizations and increased their coordination so as to create a
broader social force.80 In addition to land, these groups demanded access to credit
and state services, the maintenance of state subsidies, and reduced production costs.
In the struggle to achieve these goals, little distinction could be made between the
economic and social demands of the campesinos and the political struggle to achieve
those demands. The threat to the continuation of the peasant way of life produced the
75 Carlos Campos, Representative of UPAGRA, Speech to U.S. Citizens in Costa Rica for Peace.
76 Reuben Soto, 1982, p. 89-90. The historie ega1itarian distribution of land in Costa Rica had ceased to
representative of the agricultural situation long before the 1970s. According to the agricultural census
of 1984, 6.3 percent of the largest farmers worked 61.2 percent of all farmland while 46.9 percent of
producers worked only 2.5 percent of land in agriculture.
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conditions necessary for a more integrated peasant movement and stimulated the
call for direct action which resulted in road blockages, the seizure of institutional
offices, and campesino marches.8I Between 1980 and 1982, 3,350 land invasions were
reported and the continuation of land seizures in 1983 marked the new level of
organization and coordination achieved by campesino groups. By this time, peasant
organizations had spread beyond the efforts of the landless and incl uded small and
medium producers as well.82
By September of 1986, the peasant movement realized that it would never be
able to successfully achieve its demands unless the national level criteria for the
management of the economic crisis were changed and until a way was found to
mitigate the influence of the international financial organizations. According to
peasant leaders, economic policies needed to be redirected to respond to the national
interest, to meet the needs of the popular classes, and to guarantee social justice.83
On September 1, 1986, ten of the most important peasant organizations sent a letter to
President Arias which protested government policy towards the basic grains
producers and demanded that a new policy be implemented. In the letter, the
campesino organizations made it clear that they objected to the agricultural policies
of the international financial organizations, policies that they viewed as being
opposed to the patriotic and democratic development of Costa Rica. They demanded
improvements in the functioning of democratic institutions and stated that
agricultural policy should meet the following objectives: guarantee the right of
peasants to continue producing in just conditions; provide technical assistance to
small and medium producers; allow for the meaningful participation of campesino
organizations in the definition, planning, and implementation of agricultural policy;
improve the distribution of wealth produced by the agricultural sector; provide
sufficient and timely credit; and guarantee sufficient land for peasant producers.84
The letter went on to suggest that the government should support small and medium
producers by not importing any agricultural product that could be produced in the
country, that institutions supporting peasant producers (IDA, CNP, MAG) should be
strengthened, and that production for export should be redirected to benefit small
and medium producers.85
The demands made in the letter to Oscar Arias were backed up by a march by
700 campesinos in San Jose on September 17, 1986. Although the march was broken
up by tear gas fired by the Guardia Civil, a compromise was eventually reached with
the government that was initially viewed favorably by the peasant organizations.86
The government promised to pursue an agrarian policy that corresponded to the
needs of Costa Rican producers and consumers and to initiate a process of
permanent dialogue with peasant leaders. In October, the Arias administration
released a document that stressed the importance of the concept of permanent
dialogue but that also officially introduced the program of agricultura de cambio.
The permanent dialogue recognized that food security should be in the hands of
81 Mora A, 1988, p. 41
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Costa Rican producers and that food self-sufficiency was of fundamental importance
in the maintenance of independent and sovereign decision-making for the nation as
a whole.87
Despite the optimism generated by the permanent dialogue, the conditions
confronting the peasant sector failed to improve. In August of 1987, the major
campesino organizations sent another letter to President Arias in which they stated
that they confronted a situation in which production was becoming impossible and
that they were being subjected to unemployrnent, misery, and the loss of their land.
They demanded credit and technical assistance, and called for an end of the
agrarian policy imposed by international financial organizations. Peasant
organizations denounced the failure of the government to fulfill its previous
promises, criticized the persistent destimulation of the production of basic grains,
and stated that agricultura de cambio onIy benefitted those who produced for exporto
A second march on San Jose was held on September 15, 1987 and peasant
organizations involved in the march demanded that the agreements with the IMF,
the World Bank, and AID be suspended or revised. In addition, the marchers
demanded that economic policy be changed to respond to the needs of the popular
sectors and that organizations which traditionally assisted small and medium
producers, such as the Instituto de Desarrollo Agricola (IDA), the Ministerio de
Agricultura y Ganaderia (MAG), and the Consejo Nacional de Produccion (CNP), be
strengthened and refinanced.88
In response, the government rejected the possibility of altering the
international agreements and claimed that it was fulfilling the rest of the campesino
demands. For the peasant organizations, the attitude expressed by the government
was but one more example of the failure of the state to live up to promises made to the
small and medium producers. In January of 1988, 23 organizations representing
small, medium, and large producers of basic grains formed the Union Nacional del
Sector Agropecuario (UNSA), and threatened to paralyze production if the
government did not change its policies regarding credit and prices and guarantee
the right of the peasantry to continue producing basic food items.89 Once again, the
government made a series of promises that defused the immediate situation, but
little changed for peasant producers.
The creation of UNSA was the culmination of almost a decade of
organizational activity in the peasant sector. This activity resulted in the regístration
of 99 agricultural organizations with the Ministry of Labor and Social Security by
1986, 70 percent of which were small producer organizations. Fully 2/3 of these
organizations were formed in the post-1984 period and almost 20 percent of the
peasant organizations were independent, that is, did not belong to any confederation
or central union.90 The most important peasant sector organization was the Union
N acional de Pequeños y Medianos Productores Agropecuarios Costarricenses
(UPANACIONAL) which formed in 1981 with 13,769 initial members. Other
significant groups included the Union de Pequeños Agricultures del Atlantico
(UP AGRA), which was formed in 1978 by 5,000 corn producers in the Atlantic regíon,
87 Union Nacional del Sector Agropecuario CUNSA), 1988, p. VI
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and the Union Campesina y de Trabajadores Agricolas del Norte (UTAN) which was
founded in 1982 and concentrated its efforts on seeking land titles for those who
worked untitled land.91 While these organizations gradually saw the need for a
coordinated approach to improve the agricultural situation, the diversity of interests
formed a barrier to the creation of an effective central organization. Some groups
worked primarily for land reform, such as the Federacion Sindical Agraria Nacional
(FESIAN) and the Federacion Nacional Campesina (FENAC), while others, such as
UPANACIONAL, concentrated their efforts on gaining access to credit and technical
assistance. Many of these groups tried to form a national organization in 1984, the
Coordinadora Agraria Nacional, but this attempt failed due to differences in the
definition of the types of action should be undertaken.92 The differences in
orientations and ideologies made it difficult for these groups to work together.
UPANACIONAL became one of the most important popular sector
organizations in the country and grew to a total of 22,000 members, all of whom are
small and medium producers.93 In contrast to organizations of basic grains
producers, approximately 50 percent of the members of UPANACIONAL are coffee
growers while 35 percent produce vegetables. The organization was originally
formed to address the problems encountered by small and medium coffee producers
during the economic crisis. Most of these producers had previously relied on state
programs to address their economic and social problems but their declining
standard of living created the need for an organized effort to protect their interests.94
They found that they could not press their claims against government policy through
their traditional organizational forms, usually coffee cooperatives, due to legal and
economic reasons, and therefore found it necessary to form a new organization.95
The objective of UPANACIONAL was to defend the interests of the small and
medium coffee, and later vegetable, producers and the organization sought to
maintain the following positions: political independence; avoid political ideology and
communist or totalitarian tendencies; maintain Christian standards; and seek to
strengthen democracy, peace, and social justice.96
The primary goal of UPANACIONAL was to channel the participation of
small and medium producers in order to demonstrate that they were capable of
making decisions with respect to development issues that affected society as a whole.
This goal arose from the lack of state support for small and medium producers, a
situation that was primarily caused by the absence of representation of these sectors
in the political power structure. The lack of political representation created
obstacles for small producers and prevented them from defending their interests
against those who had political and economic power.97 It was for this reason,
according to UP ANACIONAL, that campesinos needed to use unorthodox methods
to bring pressure to bear on the government, especially when negotiations failed.
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While UPANACIONAL recognized that there were no quick solutions for the
problems in the agricultural sector, the organization defended the goal of food self-
sufficiency, stressed the need for increased prices for campesino produce,and
supported changes in agricultura de cambio that would allow for the incorporation
of small and medium producers. The organization also criticized the increasing role
of multinational corporations in the country and believed that their strong presence
gave them the potential to control Costa Rican agriculture.98
During 1982 and 1983, UP ANACIONAL mobilized its members and confronted
the government by blocking roads in order to show the seriousness of the discontent
with the agrarian situation. The mobilizations of 1982 resulted in improved access to
credit but new difficulties soon arose with the Monge administration concerning the
lack of the fulfillment of previous agreements regarding input prices and
commercialization. This resulted in the mobilization of 10,000 UPANACIONAL
members in March of 1983, and the government promptly agreed to negotiate the
organization's demands.99 These negotiations continued through the second half of
1983 but in J anuary of 1984 the government increased the prices of agricultural
inputs, a move which was protested by UP ANACIONAL. However, by this time the
ability of the organization to mobilize its members had dissipated and, instead of
trying to reform government policy, the organization began to prioritize the
administration of its own projects involving the importation of agricultural
chemicals and the improvement of the commercialization of vegetables. This
orientation detracted from any serious effort to improve the overall agricultural
situation and the government continued to promise actions which were never
undertaken and failed to develop a response to the demands of small and medium
producers. By 1985, UPANACIONAL all but abandoned its efforts to achieve policy
reform and seemed content with the limited concessions that it had previously
achieved.100
UPAGRA, the Union de Pequeños Agricultores del Atlantico, is the major
campesino organization in the Atlantic region and its membership consists
primarily of corn producers. The organization is part of a loosely organized
confederation consisting of ten peasant groups in the regíon and the structure of
UPAGRA itself is informal and relies on the participation of its members on an as
needed basis. However, the strength of the movement has steadily increased due to
the unfavorable situation confronting basic grains producers in Costa Rica and the
continued failure of the government to deliver on its promises.101 UPAGRA has
maintained political independence and considers itself to be a c1ass based
organization attempting to build a popular movement through mobilization and
democracy. The major objective of the organization is to assure the continuation of
the peasant way of life and to achieve a better distribution of wealth as well as
supporting the right to land, the right to produce basic grains, and the right to
receive a fair price for peasant production.102 Support by UPAGRA for the
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continued production of basic grains and the improvement of conditions of
commercialization of those products put the organization in direct confrontation with
the pressures exerted by the international financial organizations which have
demanded the destimulation of corn production. Yellow corn imported through the
PL 480 program has directIy affected local production and many producers in the
Atlantic region have had to sell their land and have either become part of the poorly
paid rural proletariat or have migrated to urban areas.103
The active participation of peasants in the search for solutions to their
problems is considered essential by UP AGRA and this belief resulted in a series of
road closures and mobilizations as the organization confronted the government with
its demands. In January of 1986, for example, peasant corn producers in Guapiles
blocked the main artery to the Atlantic coast to protest the lack of government action
on a previous agreement concerning payrnents for losses caused by a hurricane in
May of 1985. The blockade ended when the government once again promised to fulfill
it obligations.104 In addition to indemnification for previous losses, UPAGRA's
demands included the reduction of interest rates for basic grains producers, the
termination of corn imports, and the revitalization of government agencies which
have traditionally assisted basic grains producers.105
Prior to 1985, the majority of mobilizations in the countryside were undertaken
by landless peasants who demanded land on which to produce basic grains. These
manifestations were coordinated by groups such as UTAN, FESIAN, and FENAC,
among others, and consisted of land invasions, hunger strikes, and marches as well
as dialogue and negotiation with government representatives.106 As the economic
situation of small and medium producers deteriorated, they became increasingly
involved in the movement to pro test government agricultural policy through
organizations such as UPAGRA and many others. In January of 1988, the Union
N acional del Sector Agropecuario (UNSA) was formed and became the first national
level organization to incorporate small, medium, and large producers. Given the
diversified membership of UNSA, the organization attempted to encompass and
represent a broad range of views and to force the recognition of the general nature of
the agricultural crisis. By April of 1988, approximately 30 associations, federations,
small producer organizations and other groups joined UNSA and began a series of
activities to publicize the nature of the problems in the rural areas and to develop
social awareness.107 UNSA provided a national level forum through which small
producers could negotiate with the government. Local and regional protests had
proven ineffective in terms of having an impact on government policy and peasants
hoped to achieve better resuIts through active participation in a national
organization. It was thought that unification through UNSA would obligate the
government to respond to peasant concerns.
The fundamental demands of UNSA varied little from the demands which had
be en made by peasant organizations throughout the 1980s, and included the
following: increased access to credit; a guarantee that the government would
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support the production of basic grains and provide sufficient land for peasant
producers; increased producer prices for basic grains; and the formation of
commissions consisting of government representatives and UNSA members to
search for solutions to the agricultural crisis. In addition, UNSA representatives
wrote a long document analyzing the agrarian situation and proposed solutions to
the crisis. This document was presented to the government in April of 1988 and
UNSA indicated that they expected a government response within ten days.
According to UNSA's analysis, the government should support a policy of self-
sufficiency in basic grains, develop a coordinated agricultural policy to be directed by
a single agency, and a method should be developed to allow for small producers to
become involved in agricultura de cambio in order to prevent multinational
corporations and large producers from completely dominating the agricultural
sector.108 The government response to UNSA's proposals focused mostly on the
cattle industry, which was dominated by large ranchers, and on traditional and non-
traditional export crops in which the peasantry was unable to participate. UNSA
viewed the government response as insufficient and wrote a letter directly to
President Arias expressing their concerns. In response to the lack of government
concern for the plight of basic grains producers, 2,500 small and medium producers
blocked roads and bridges and seized buildings in Parrita, Guacimo, Santa Cruz,
and Cañas from July 8-13, 1988. As a result of this mobilization a new round of
negotiations was begun and joint commissions were formed to study the agricultural
situation, but conditions in the countryside remained unchanged.109
CONCLUSION
The inability of the peasant sector to have a significant impact on economic
policy making in Costa Rica was the result of several seemingly insurmountable
barriers. The economic crisis and increasing debt service payments caused the
Monge and Arias administrations to turn to the assistance offered by the
International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and AID. However, this assistance
was tied to a series of conditions which forced the Costa Rican government to
substantially alter its previous development model and the resulting neoliberal
orientation had a strong negative impact on basic grains producers. The policies
proposed by the international financial organizations found strong local support in
the well established and influential commercial, agricultural, and industrial groups
of the wealthy business elite. These groups enjoyed ready access to the political
decision-makers and, in combination with the international organizations, were able
to end the previous mixed economic model in which the state played a significant
roleo In addition, the peasant sector had little organizational history in Costa Rica
and by the time they were able to create potentially powerful organizations they faced
a situation in which the new economic policies were already well entrenched. The
state had always taken care of the basic needs of the popular sectors in Costa Rica
and the favorable conditions created by the expanding economy of the thirty year
period prior to the late 1970s postponed the need to for the peasantry to form
108 CEPAS, 1988a, p. 19
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autonomous organizations to defend their interests. Thus they were totally
unprepared to challenge the structural adjustment which directly affected their lives
in the 1980s.
The diverse nature of peasant organizations in Costa Rica made it very
difficult for them to coordinate together in order to increase their influence in society.
Some organizations concentrated on land reform (UTAN, FESIAN, FENAC), others
supported the demands of small basic grains producers (UPAGRA), and still others,
whose constituents were coffee and vegetable producers (UPANACIONAL),
confronted a different set of concerns and government policies. The difficulty of
coordinating the concerns of these groups was well illustrated by the relationship
which developed between UPANACIONAL and UNSA. UPANACIONAL attended
the first meeting of UNSA but subsequently withdrew from the organization to
pursue a separate settlement with the government. Representatives of
UPANACIONAL claimed that the organization supported the peasant movement but
that they lacked a clear understanding of UNSA. While the two organizations
expressed similar concerns, a clear difference existed in their perspectives of how to
solve the agrarian crisis. While groups such as UP AGRA and others emphasized
the need for structural change to defend the interests of the peasantry, more
conservative organizations, such as UPANACIONAL, were content to try to improve
their situation within the export dominated economic framework. The
compromising position of UPANACIONAL reflected the strong role of coffee
producers in that organization and the importance of coffee exports to the Costa
Rican economy. However, even given these different perspectives and
circumstances, representatives of UPANACIONAL don't discount the possibility of
working with UNSA in the future.11O
The peasant sector has not played a significant role the debate surrounding the
structural adjustment of the economy and the imposition of neoliberal policies in
Costa Rica. Despite the numerous mobilizations and protests of recent years, no
alternative position has emerged and the government has made few concessions to
the basic grains producers. An important factor contributing to the impotence of the
peasant movement is that the impact of the economic changes of the 1980s is just
beginning to make itself felt. While the leadership of the campesino organizations is
well aware of the full extent of the negative consequences of the neoliberal policies,
the peasantry in general lacks a clear understanding of the depth of the changes
confronting them. The agreements with the international financial organizations
prohibit the return to previous customs and social conditions in Costa Rica and limit
the sovereignty of decision-making necessary to incorporate the concerns of the
peasant sector into an integrated development model. The changes of the 1980s have
created a polarization of society such as has not been previously experienced in Costa
Rica. The new development model lacks any mechanism to spread the benefits of
economic growth and the result has be en a concentration of income and wealth. The
cuts in social programs and the privatization of state enterprises, particularly the
banks, has reduced the space in which political participation might have an impact
on economic policy and has resulted in the concentration of political and economic
110 Interview with Guido Vargas, Director, and Jorge Luis Hernandez, Coordinator of Training and
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power .111 While no studies have investigated the structure of land tenure since
1983, it is well known that peasants are selling their lands and migrating to urban
areas because they can no longer succeed economically.112
While the peasant movement encountered a well organized opposition, it was
still in the initial stages of development and has yet to clearly articulate its goals and
to solidify its organizational structures. For the most part, the demands of peasant
organizations focused on how to create marginally better conditions for survival
within a system which clearly did not meet their needs. The lack of political and
ideological development limited the search for practical alternatives to the neoliberal
model.l13 Participation in the peasant movement was sporadic and opportunistic
and the lack of coordination between organizations limited their impacto The lack of
unity and a stable organizational structure limited the effectiveness of UNSA which
remained a temporary alliance of peasant groups rather than an organization with a
permanent membership. Organizations constantIy entered and departed from
UNSA which prevented the creation of a defined strategy or a platform of
demands.114 During the latter part of 1988, UNSA experienced an internal power
struggle and was forced to temporarily suspend its efforts on behalf of the peasant
sector. lIS The government took advantage of this lack of unity among peasant
organizations and simply ignored the demands of the sector as a whole and
concentrated its efforts on solidifying the position of those who cultivated export
crops.
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